Abstract

British diplomacy and intelligence: Japanese advance into French Indo-China and British Far Eastern Strategy, July 1941

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Documents on signal intelligence released at the National Archives (Kew, UK) give us a chance to consider a link between intelligence and decision-making in Whitehall. By using these documents, it is possible to follow a flow of information from intelligence services to policy makers. This essay will discuss Whitehall’s intelligence management in 1941 from three points of view, intelligence collection, analysis and utilization, dealing with British Far Eastern strategy and Japanese advance into South French Indo-China in July 1941.

British GC&CS (Government Cipher and Code School) and FECB (Far Eastern Combined Bureau) played a main part to collect signal information on Japan. The signal information was analyzed by certain governmental organizations, such as Foreign Office, Far Eastern Committee, and Joint Intelligence sub-Committee and policy makers could exploit the analyzed information. Viewing the Indo-China affairs through intelligence documents, we ought to know the process of intelligence and decision-making in Whitehall.